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•	 Although	 the	oligarchic	 system	does	have	 some	positive	 elements	 (for	
example,	 it	 contributes	 to	pluralism	 in	political	 life	and	 the	media),	 it	
needs	to	be	stated	that	the	overall	influence	of	Ukrainian	big	business	
is	harmful	and	hinders	the	country’s	development	in	both	political	and	
economic	 terms.	 The	monopolisation	 of	 the	 key	 economic	 sectors	 has	































it	 is	 very	 likely	 that	Russia	would	 take	 control	 of	 a	number	of	Ukraine’s	
strategic	companies	should	an	emergency	situation	arise	(for	example,	the	
second	wave	of	the	economic	crisis).	



































big	business	 is	 subordinate	 to	 the	 government,	will	 be	 created.	Yanuko-
vych’s	main	weaknesses	are	the	limited	number	of	people	who	he	can	see	
as	 unconditionally	 loyal	 to	 him	 and	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 other	 oligarchic	
groups.	It	seems	that	the	most	 likely	scenario	for	the	development	of	the	
situation	 in	 the	next	 few	years	 (at	 least	until	 the	presidential	election	 in	
2015)	will	be	the	development	of	a	compromise	between	the	oligarchs	and	

























Ihor Kolomoyskyi and 



















































very	 superficially,	while	 it is impossible to understand modern Ukraine 
without understanding a number of dependencies existing between the 
































































































































prime	minister	and	minister	 for	 infrastructure	–	 they	own	considerable	
fortunes	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 hold	 prominent	 functions	 in	 the	 govern-














I. The eMeRGeNce OF The OlIGARchIc sysTeM  
AND ITs FORM IN 1991–2004 
1. The genesis of the oligarchic system








clans)	began	 to	emerge	during	 the	period	of	 the	 country’s	political	 and	eco-
nomic	transformation.	The	factor	which	united	these	groups	was	either	com-





















Dnipropetrovsk	 and	 Zaporizhia	 Oblasts).	 The	 remaining	 industrial	 centres,	





































































Frame 1. The rise and fall of Pavlo lazarenko
Lazarenko,	who	comes	from	the	Dnipropetrovsk	Oblast,	may	be	recognised	
as	a	symbol	of	the	first,	unusually	turbulent	period	of	change	in	Ukraine	


















2	 Киевская семерка, Инвестгазета,	10	March	2003,	http://www.investgazeta.net/politika-
i-ekonomika/kievskaja-semerka-144187/




4	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 ‘Ukraińska	 metalurgia:	 gospodarcze	 ogniwo	 oligarchicznego	 systemu	
władzy’,	Analizy	OSW,	1	May	2002.	





















cance	 has	 since	 fallen	 in	 Ukraine.	 However,	 the	 Lazarenko	 case	 would	
have	 probably	 not	 been	 worth	mentioning	 if	 not	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 Yulia	
Tymoshenko,	who	directed	YESU	in	1995–1997,	embarked	on	her	political	
and	business	 career	by	his	 side.	Later	 she	was	elected	 to	 the	parliament	
and	acted	as	Lazarenko’s	deputy	 in	his	party,	Hromada.	 In	 1999,	when	 it	
became	clear	that	Lazarenko’s	fall	was	inevitable	(and	also	to	protect	her	
own	assets),	Tymoshenko	established	her	own	party,	Batkivshchyna	 (Fa-
















6	 ‘Pavlo	Lazarenko	 is	 facing	dirty	money	 laundering	 charges’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	
no.	186,	8	June	2000.	

















sian	Khodorkovsky	case	has	never	 taken	place	 in	Ukraine.	On	 the	contrary,	
Kuchma’s	 position	was	 essentially	 undermined	 in	 2000	due	 to	 the	 ‘Cassette	
Scandal’9,	and	he	became	more	and	more	dependent	on	big	business.	
3. The beginnings of a system crisis
At	the	end	of	Kuchma’s	presidency,	the	decomposition	of	the	clan	system	was	
more	and	more	evident.	However,	this	did	not	mean	that	the	oligarchs’	influ-
ence	 had	weakened.	As	 individual	 businessmen	were	 gaining	 strength,	 the	
need	to	maintain	regional	bonds	was	lessening,	while	the	need	to	protect	in-
dividual	interests	was	growing.	The	process	of	the	disintegration	of	the	clans	




The	process	of	 legalising	 the	 fortunes	of	representatives	of	big	business	was	
also	developing	at	a	fast	rate.	Before	that,	their	ownership	was	usually	infor-






RosUkrEnergo,	 a	 company	which	 was	 established	 in	 July	 2004	 to	 act	 as	 an	
























intermediary	 in	 gas	 imports	 to	 Ukraine	 from	 Central	 Asia	 and	 Russia	 (see	
Frame	2).	At	 that	 stage,	 representatives	of	 this	 group,	 the	 then	head	of	Naf-




lobbied	 for	Russian	 interests	 on	numerous	 occasions.	 The	 view	 that	 Firtash	
is	merely	a	figurehead,	who	only	represents	the	interests	of	other	people	(not	
necessarily	originating	from	Ukraine),	is	quite	widespread12.	
Frame 2. RosUkrenergo and gas imports from Russia
Gas	trade	with	Russia	and	Turkmenistan13	was	one	of	the	most	profitable	
ways	of	doing	business	 in	Ukraine	and	Russia	 alike.	The	way	of	making	
money	was	 simple.	 Instead	 of	 signing	 contracts	 directly	with	 the	 state-
controlled	monopolies,	Naftogaz	and	Gazprom,	the	services	of	intermedi-
















14	 Katarzyna	 Pełczyńska-Nałęcz,	 Iwona	 Wiśniewska,	 ‘Rosyjsko-ukraiński	 kompromis	 ga-
zowy’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	422,	5	January	2006.
15	 Владимир Бережной, ‘Кто владеет украинским газом’,	Известия, 26	April	2006,	http://
izvestia.ru/news/313258
16	 Сергей Никонов, ‘Хамодержавие или донецкие уже передрались’,	ОРД,	 6	March	 2010,	
http://ord-ua.com/2010/03/06/hamoderzhavie-ili-donetskie-uzhe-peredralis/?lpage=1































































mally	 independent	but	 in	 fact	 they	were	willing	 to	co-operate	with	 the	 rul-
ing	camp21.	Apart	from	the	SDPU(o),	the	key	groupings	which	represented	big	
business	 were	 the	 Labour	 Party	 (the	 Dnipropetrovsk	 group)	 and	 the	 Party	
of	Regions	(the	Donetsk	group).	The	two	latter	parties	entered	parliament	as	
members	of	the	pro-presidential	bloc	For	United	Ukraine.	Although	this	bloc	




enon.	 The	 significance	 of	 people	 representing	 medium-sized	 business	 was	
growing.	They	centred	around	Our	Ukraine,	the	bloc	led	by	Viktor	Yushchen-














































was	 to	 indicate	 a	 successor,	 a	 variant	which	 had	 been	 successfully	 put	 into	












































enforcement	agencies	being	ordered	 to	use	 force	against	 the	demonstrators.	
The	president	 agreed	 for	 the	 runoff	 to	be	 repeated	 in	 exchange	 for	 security	
guarantees.	The	price	for	allowing	a	fair	election	to	be	held	was	Yushchenko’s	













































Frame 3. The Kolesnikov case
Kolesnikov	was	one	of	 the	most	 influential	 politicians	 from	 the	Party	of	
Regions	 and	 a	 business	 partner	 of	 Rinat	 Akhmetov.	 In	November	 2004,	
he	 took	 part	 in	 a	 congress	 in	 Sievierodonetsk29	 (Luhansk	Oblast),	where	
























ties	 in	connection	with	 this	matter	but	was	arrested	 for	another	reason.	
Borys	Penchuk,	the	president	of	the	Anti-Corruption	Foundation	and	the	
author	of	the	book	entitled	‘Donetsk	Mafia:	Anthology’,	made	a	report	to	the	
prosecution	authorities	accusing	Kolesnikov	of	a	 raider	 takeover30	of	 the	
shares	in	a	shopping	centre	in	Donetsk	owned	by	Penchuk.	Kolesnikov	was	
arrested	in	April	2005.	However,	he	was	released	more	than	three	months	


















lation	 of	 all	 the	 other	 dubious	 takeovers	 of	 state-controlled	 assets	 proved	







31	 Юлия Рябчун, ‘Борис Пенчук оказался неусидчивым’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	24	Febru-
ary	2010,	http://kommersant.ua/doc/1327358
32	 Anna	Górska,	‘Sukces	prywatyzacyjny	ukraińskich	władz’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	
414,	27	October	2005.



















1. The orange ‘oligarchic democracy’
Following	the	victory	of	Viktor	Yushchenko,	the	following	three	political	cen-
tres	formed	in	Ukraine:	(1)	the	presidential	team	along	with	the	Our	Ukraine	
party,	 (2)	 the	 Yulia	 Tymoshenko	 Bloc,	 whose	 leader	 held	 the	 post	 of	 prime	
minister	 for	 the	greater	part	 of	 the	period	 in	question35,	 and	 (3)	 the	opposi-
tion	among	whom	the	Party	of	Regions	played	the	key	role.	The	amendment	









2007	finally	fixed	 in	place	 the	 change	 in	 the	map	of	 influence	 from	 the	key	
oligarchic	groups	which	had	begun	with	 the	Orange	Revolution.	The	results	
of	both	elections	were	similar:	the	Party	of	Regions	won,	while	the	Yulia	Ty-
moshenko	 Bloc	 received	 slightly	 lower	 support	 and	 remained	 the	 strongest	




cance	of	 the	Kyiv	clan.	The	SDPU(o),	on	which	 the	clan’s	 influence	had	been	

















































37	 According	 to	Ukrainian	media,	Vladimir	Putin	and	Dmitry	Medvedev’s	wife	 in	2004	be-
came	 the	 godparents	 of	 one	 of	Medvedchuk’s	 daughters; Тарас Козуб, Елена Галаджий, 
‘Медведчук возвращается в политику, чтобы бороться за Евразию’, Комсомольская 























litical	 forces	unrelated	 to	 the	Donetsk	clan.	They	sought	election	 in	2006	as	


















38	 Виктор Чивокуня, ‘Янукович с Ахметовым получили билет на войну’, Yкраинская 
Правда,	3 April	2007,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/4b1aaf6b37fef/

















impact:	 Tymoshenko’s	 party	 clearly	 relied	 on	 its	 leader,	 while	 Yanukovych	
would	always	have	to	balance	various	interests	inside	his	party.	


















camp.	Yushchenko	 treated	 the	 support	 from	 this	 group	as	 a	way	 to	become	
partly	independent	from	the	circles	linked	to	Our	Ukraine43.	In	2006,	Valeriy	
Khoroshkovskyi,	the	owner	of	the	TV	channel	Inter,	who	was	believed	to	be	
40	 In	 2005,	Vasadze	 bought	Warsaw’s	 FSO	 car	 factory;	Danuta	Walewska,	 ‘Tarieł	Wasadze:	







































Frame 4. Russian capital takes over IsD 
Ukrainian	business	was	preventing	Russian	capital	 from	expanding	 into	
Ukraine’s	most	 important	 branch	 of	 industry,	metallurgy.	The	 economic	
crisis	 of	 2009	 caused	 the	 Industrial	 Union	 of	 Donbass	 (ISD),	 which	 had	










44	 Сергей Никонов, ‘Как Хорошковский на госслужбе разбогател’,	ОРД,	20	May	2009,	http://
ord-ua.com/2009/05/20/horosh/?lpage=1
45	 Anna	 Górska,	 Iwona	 Wiśniewska,	 ‘Russian	 investors	 enter	 the	 Ukrainian	 metallurgy	











































ing	 business.	 In	 2008–2010,	 through	 dubious	 legal	 operations,	 Kolomoyskyi	
46	 Anna	 Górska,	 ‘Rosja–Ukraina:	 pogłębiona	 współpraca	 czy	 fuzja	 w	 metalurgii?’,	 OSW,	
Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	472,	22	February	2007.	
47	 This	 bank	 was	 sold	 in	 2007	 for	 US$2	 billion	 to	 Italy’s	 UniCredit	 Group, Елена Губарь, 
Александр Черновалов, ‘Суммашествие UniCredit	Group	приобрел Укрсоцбанк за $2,07 
















Frame 5. The war over the Kremenchuk refinery
Ukrtatnafta,	 a	 company	whose	 key	 asset	 is	Ukraine’s	 largest	 refinery	 in	

























48	 ‘Суд подтвердил права государства на оспариваемые 18,3% акций „Укртатнафты”’,	
Зеркало недели, 7	June	2008,	http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/sud_podtverdil_prava_gosudarst-
va_na_osparivaemye_18,3_aktsiy_ukrtatnafty-53884.html
49	 ‘Суд признал незаконной покупку Татарстаном 28,8% „Укртатнафты”, Новости 
Донбасса, 19	March	2009,	http://novosti.dn.ua/details/77408/
50	 Олег Гавриш, Андрей Леденев, ‘„Приват” сконцентрировался на „Укртатнафте”, Ком­
















2. Tymoshenko’s conflict with the RUe Group
As	has	been	mentioned	earlier	in	this	text,	representatives	of	the	RUE	Group	
formed	the	business	base	 for	both	 the	Party	of	Regions	and	President	Yush-
chenko.	Tymoshenko	 saw	RUE	as	 a	dangerous	opponent	because	 it	 support-













coming	presidential	 campaign.	Gazprom	also	 allowed	Naftogaz	 to	 take	 over	
11	billion	m3	of	gas	owned	by	RosUkrEnergo.	





President	 Yushchenko	 made	 another	 attempt	 at	 dissolving	 the	 parliament	
in	2008.	Furthermore,	a	deep	economic	crisis	began	in	Ukraine	in	late	2008.	
Since	Tymoshenko	had	limited	funds	at	her	disposal,	in	her	anti-crisis	policy	
she	 directed	 state	 support	 to	 the	 businessmen	 linked	 to	 BYuT,	 and	 left	 the	
51	 The	 estimated	 cost	 of	 election	 campaign	 which	 enables	 winning	 one	 seat	 in	 parlia-
ment	 ranged	 between	 US$1	 billion	 and	 US$20	 billion,	 depending	 on	 the	 constituency,	















Therefore,	 part	 of	 the	 Party	 of	Regions’	 financial	 base	 linked	 to	Akhmetov	
wanted	to	reach	a	compromise	with	BYuT	so	as	to	improve	the	state’s	finan-














































4.  The presidential election of 2010
As	the	coalition	talks	ended	in	failure,	the	stakes	in	the	presidential	election	
grew	 significantly.	Were	 Yanukovych	 to	 lose	 the	 election,	 this	 would	 most	
likely	have	spelt	the	end	of	his	political	career.	If	Tymoshenko	won,	she	would	

















Frame 6. The oligarchs and the media
The	media	are	a	special	example	of	the	domination	the	oligarchs	wield	in	


































from	Ukraine57	 and	national	 television	have	practically	no	 say.	Owing	 to	
their	connections	in	the	government,	the	dominating	oligarchs	are	able	to	





















controls	 the	Kommentarii	weekly	 and	 Internet	 portal	 and	 the	WeeklyUA	































































































III. The OlIGARchs AFTeR VIKTOR yANUKOVych’s 
VIcTORy
Big	business	welcomed	the	introduction	of	the	new	parliamentary-presiden-
tial	 system	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 Orange	 Revolution.	 This	 resolved	 their	
problem	with	the	strong	presidential	administration,	which	could	have	posed	
a	threat	to	the	oligarchs.	However,	the	chaos	and	the	incessant	political	crisis	










groups	 connected	 to	 it	 –	 the	Donetsk	 clan	 and	 the	RUE	 group	 –	was	 taking	
place.	 The	 significance	 of	 the	 other	 political	 groupings	 and	 political	 parties	
was	limited	to	a	great	extent.	
1. The key groups of influence in the state administration












58	 Хара: ‘Левочкин и компания ограничивают Януковича в информации’,	Зеркало Недели, 

















President	Yanukovych.	The	 fact	 that	he	has	been	put	 in	charge	of	 the	NSDC	
may	mean	that	this	institution	will	be	given	more	significance	in	the	future,	
but	now	it	is	too	early	to	draw	such	conclusions.	
























59	 Николай Туманов, Сколько стоит Евро-2012,	Комментарии,	15	April	2011,	http://smi.liga.
net/articles/2011-04-15/763142-skolko-stoit-evro2012.htm;	during	the	four	years	of	prepa-
rations,	 the	 state	 spent	 41.7	 billion	 hryvnias; ‘За четыре года подготовки к Евро-2012 














































61	 Ольга Куришко, Сергей Сидоренко, ‘Партия сыграна’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	 19	March	
2012,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1895908?isSearch=True
62	 According	to	some	sources,	the	main	sponsor	of	the	Lytvyn	Bloc	is	Vasyl	Khmelnytsky,	an	
MP	of	the	Party	of	Regions	and	a	less	powerful	oligarch,	Мустафа Найєм, Сергій Лещенко, 





















equally	 important	 reason	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 representatives	 of	 big	 business	





























































Internet	portals	which	 support	 the	opposition.	Little	 reliable	 information	 is	
available,	 so	 it	 is	difficult	 to	assess	 the	scale	of	 this	phenomenon.	 In	 turn,	 it	
is	relatively	easy	to	track	the	increasing	influence	of	‘the	family’	in	the	state	
administration.	 Serhiy	Arbuzov,	who	was	 reputed	 to	have	been	 the	person-
al	 banker	 of	 the	 Yanukovych	 family,	was	 appointed	 as	 the	 president	 of	 the	
National	Bank	of	Ukraine	 in	 late	2010.	 In	 turn,	Oleksandr	Klimenko,	who	 is	




large	 shopping	 and	 residential	 buildings	 in	Donetsk	 and	 co-operated	with	Embrol-Engi-
neering,	which	was	owned	by	Anton	Pryhodsky,	an	MP	from	the	Party	of	Regions.	Сергей 


































It	 is	 clearly	 more	 difficult	 to	 determine	 the	 real	 influence	 ‘the	 family’	 has	
gained	in	business.	Economic	issues	are	supervised	by	Oleksandr	Yanukovych	
and	Yuriy	Ivanyushchenko,	an	MP	and	a	member	of	the	Party	of	Regions.	‘The	










there	are	no	grounds	 to	state	 that	 the	pro-Russian	 faction	 in	 the	Ukrainian	government	
has	been	strengthened	due	 to	 their	nominations.	Cf.	Юлия Мостовая, ‘Эх ты, ксивушка 




















Frame 7. The mysterious yura yenakievskiy
Yuriy	 Ivanyushchenko,	 who	 is	 commonly	 known	 in	 the	 media	 as	 Yura	






Ivanyushchenko	 comes	 from	 Yenakieve,	 the	 hometown	 of	 Yanukovy-
ch,	which	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 speculation	 in	many	 publications	 that	 he	 is	
a	childhood	friend	of	the	president75.	This	is,	though,	rather	unlikely	since	









72	 ‘Янукович и Иванющенко используют УБОП для рейдерства’ – Томенко, Газета.уа,	
22	 November	 2011,	 http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/politics/_yanukovich-i-ivanyuschenko-
ispolzuyut-ubop-dlya-rejderstva-tomenko/406043
73	 ‘Рассекречена бизнес-империя Юры Енакиевского’,	Комментарии Запорожье,	24	March	
2012,	http://zp.comments.ua/article/2012/03/24/124108.html	
74	 ‘Top	 100’,	Корреспондент.net,	 accessed	 on	 16	March	 2012,	 http://files.korrespondent.net/
projects/top100
75	 ‘2 место Юрий Иванющенко’, Корреспондент.net,	accessed	on	16	March	2012,	http://files.
korrespondent.net/projects/top100/2011/1254829







































77	 Сергей Никонов, ‘Простые хищные вещи’, ОРД,	16	March	2012,	http://ordua.com/	2010	/03/06/
prostyie-hischnyie-veschi/
78	 Артем Скоропадский, ‘Суд навел справку’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	 12	 July	 2011,	 http://
www.kommersant.ua/doc/1677368
79	 Соня Кошкина, ‘Именем Семьи’, LB.ua,	 2	 September	 2010,	 http://lb.ua/news/	2010	/	-
09/	02/63436_imenem_semi.html




late	2011	and	early	2012; ‘«Сливает» ли «семья» Юру Енакиевского?’, Хвиля,	6	March	2012,	
http://hvylya.org/analytics/politics/20566-slivaet-li-semja-juru-enakievskogo.html


























































































though	many	 of	 the	 other	 Ukrainian	 banks	 are	 controlled	 by	 oligarchs,	
these	are	medium-sized	or	small	institutions	and	have	no	decisive	impact	
85	 Бондарь: ‘«Укртелеком» купили под окружение Януковича’,	Дело,	12	March	2011;	http://
delo.ua/business/bondar-ukrtelekom-kupili-p-153780/.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 necessar-
ily	mean	 ‘the	 family’.	According	to	many	sources,	 the	person	behind	the	privatisation	of	










































Ukrainian	market,	 either	partly	or	 completely88.	Others,	 including	Com-
merzbank	and	BNP	Paribas	–	which	own	large	banks	in	Ukraine	–	are	also	
87	 According	to	estimates	by	the	McKinsey	consulting	firm,	bad	loans	make	up	35%	of	the	loan	


















in	 this	 is,	 though,	 the	 lack	of	 investors	who	would	wish	 to	purchase	 the	
institutions	they	control.	It	is	rather	unlikely	that	a	possible	sale	of	banks	
by	Western	investors	will	lead	to	a	‘re-Ukrainisation’	of	this	sector	since	it	
is	difficult	 to	 indicate	any	potential	buyers	among	 the	representatives	of	
Ukrainian	 big	 business.	 For	 this	 reason,	 a	 further	 expansion	 of	 Russian	
banks	 is	 the	most	 likely	 scenario.	 In	 2011,	 Sberbank	of	Russia	was	 espe-
cially	active;	it	has	tripled	its	assets	over	the	past	two	years	and	has	been	
rapidly	developing	the	network	of	its	banks	in	Ukraine.	










Owner (key shareholders 
and the country of origin)




2 Oschadbank 75,349 7.3% state-owned







5 UkrSibbank 42,235 4.1% BNP	Paribas	Group	(France)
6 Ukrsocbank 39,619 3.8%
Bank	Austria,	UniCredit	
Group	(Italy)
7 WTB	Bank 36,661 3.6%
a	subsidiary	of	Vneshtorg-
bank	(Russia)
8 Prominvestbank 35,279 3.4% Vnesheconombank	(Russia)
9 FUIB 29,278 2.8%
Rinat	Akhmetov	(SCM,	
Ukraine)
10 Alfa	Bank 26,157 2.5% Alfa	Group	(Russia)
























Owner (key shareholders 
and the country of origin)





14 Brokbiznes	Bank 19,398 1,9%
Oleksandr	i	Serhiy	Buriak	
(Ukraine)
15 Ukrgasbank 15,941 1,5% state-owned




17 Bank	Forum 12,453 1,2% Commerzbank	(Germany)
18 Delta	Bank 18,856 1,8% Mykola	Lagun	(Ukraine)
19 Sberbank	Rossii 15,118 1,5% a	subsidy	of	Sberbank	Rossii	











89	 Александр Дубинский, ‘Кредитпромбанк пошел по рукам’,	 Экономические известия,	
6	October	2011,	http://finance.eizvestia.com/full/kreditprombank-poshel-po-rukam
90	 Національний банк України,	accessed	on	19	March	2012,	http://www.bank.gov.ua/docca-
talog/document?id=87230
91	 Another	 opposition	 television	 channel	 is	 TVi,	whose	 viewing	 figures	 are	 however	 even	


































Firtash.	Although	Akhmetov	gained	more	 through	 the	 takeovers	and	priva-
tisations	of	state-controlled	companies,	Firtash	achieved	the	greatest	success	







































including	the	most	profitable	supplies	 to	 industrial	plants.	 In	April	2011,	 the	
government	cancelled	Naftogaz’s	monopoly	over	gas	imports,	and	thus	made	
it	possible	 for	Firtash	to	 import	gas	directly	 from	Russia.	The	National	Elec-






























































97	 In	2000,	Ukrainian	exports	accounted	 for	approximately	 12%	of	 the	global	market	of	ni-
trogen	 fertilisers.	 However,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2009,	 Ukraine’s	
share	decreased	significantly	to	a	level	of	approximately	3%	in	2010;	Наталия Билоусова, 
‘Химическая перезагрузка’,	 Укррудпром,	 27	 April	 2011,	 http://www.ukrrudprom.ua/di-
gest/Himicheskaya_perezagruzka.html
98	 The	state	owns	50%	+	1	share	in	Crimea	Titan,	and	Ostchem	owns	50%	-	1	share.








































before,	 as	an	attempt	at	 an	 illegal	 takeover.	 In	effect,	 the	works	were	 taken	
over	by	MetInvest,	which	is	controlled	by	SCM.	In	July	2011,	MetInvest	bought	
a	majority	stake	of	Zaporizhstal’s	owner.
100	 Максим Гардус, Николаев; Александр Черновалов,	‘Group	DF	вошла в порт’,	Коммерсантъ 
Украина,	29	September	2011,	http://kommersant.ua/doc/1783373









































3.3. The other oligarchs
Contrary	 to	 the	 situation	with	 the	 two	aforementioned	oligarchs,	much	 less	
is	known	about	the	ways	in	which	the	other	businessmen	linked	to	the	Party	
102	 Approximately	 50%	 of	 electricity	 in	Ukraine	 is	 produced	 by	 state-owned	nuclear	 power	
plants.	There	are	no	plans	to	privatise	them.	


















takeovers	 associated	with	 Borys	 Kolesnikov	 or	Oleksandr	 Yaroslavsky	 have	




ergy	 led	by	Yuriy	Boyko106.	 It	has	 also	been	 speculated	 that	Andriy	Klyuyev	
as	the	first	deputy	prime	minister	has	backed	the	activity	of	Livela,	the	com-




improvement	 of	 energy	 efficiency	have	 been	 spent	 on	 connecting	Klyuyev’s	
power	plants	to	the	power	grid108.	












example	of	an	article	describing	the	best-known	cases:	А. Шалайский, В. Трегубов, ‘Топ-
7 схем облегчения бюджета’, Зеркало недели,	29	December	2011,	http://zn.ua/POLITICS/
top7_shem_oblegcheniya_byudzheta__reyting_effektivno_osvoennyh_sredstv_v_
uhodyaschem_godu-94878.html























ian	 judiciary,	Privat	 still	had	enough	 funds	and	 influence	 to	obtain	verdicts	
which	were	beneficial	 for	 it.	The	 attempt	 to	deprive	Kolomoyskyi	 of	 control	
of	Ukrnafta,	which	is	formally	a	state-controlled	company,	was	unsuccessful.	
No	real	action	has	been	taken	to	 take	Ukraine’s	 largest	refinery	 in	Kremen-
chuk	away	from	Kolomoyskyi	despite	the	fact	that	Russia	has	been	endeavour-




















110	 Алексей Педосенко, ‘Донецкие пилят бизнес Коломойского?’,	 Главком,	 15	 September	
2010,	http://glavcom.ua/articles/1704.html




















The	 Party	 of	 Regions	 is	 more	 a	 platform	 on	 which	 individual	 oligarchs	
strike	deals	than	an	independent	and	powerful	centre	of	influence.	Some	
oligarchs	have	either	belonged	to	the	Party	of	Regions	from	the	beginning	





















Oligarchs who are members of the Party of regions
or support it financially
Oligarchs who are not linked































5. Other tendencies in the economy





















to	 counteract	 these	 practices.	 The	 situation	 of	 foreign	 entrepreneurs,	 even	
though	they	can	expect	help	from	their	respective	countries,	is	better	only	to	

















































position120.	The	conditions	 in	which	 foreign	 investors	are	 forced	 to	oper-
ate	are	not	evaluated	any	better.	According	to	the	survey	conducted	by	the	










































electricity	 production,	 and	 Firtash	 in	 the	 chemical	 industry.	 Kolomoyskyi’s	
121	 The	surveys	are	conducted	among	members	of	the	association	of	foreign	businessmen	doing	
business	in	Ukraine.	




124	 Юрий Панченко, ‘Рынок взяток показал рост’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	2	November	2011,	
http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1808368
125	 Ирина Ковальчук, ‘Экономика Украины вернулась к докризисному уровню’,	Сегодня,	
8	September	2011,	http://www.segodnya.ua/news/14286314.html
126	 Banking	Industry	Country	Risk	Assessment.	

















For	 example,	 Firtash	 bought	 the	 nitrogen	 fertiliser	 factory	 in	 Cherkasy	 for	




my:	agriculture	and	the	gas	sector.	Agriculture is the last highly attractive 
section of the Ukrainian economy where the influence of the most power-


















The	 gas	 negotiations	with	 Gazprom	 are	 the	 greatest	 impediment	 to	 the	 re-
structuring	of	Naftogaz.	Gazprom,	wants	to	be	given	control	over	the	entire	
128	 Андрей Самофалов, ‘Дмитрий Фирташ высаживается в Черкассах’,	Укррудпром,	4	March	
2011,	http://www.ukrrudprom.ua/digest/Dmitriy_Firtash_visagivaetsya_v_Cherkassah.html


































IV. The OlIGARchs’ INFlUeNce ON FOReIGN POlIcy
Since	regaining	independence,	Ukraine’s	foreign	policy	has	been	based	on	ma-
noeuvring	between	the	West	and	Russia.	Under	Kuchma’s	rule,	this	was	called	
a	 ‘multi-vector	policy’.	The	Orange	Revolution	changed	very	 little	 in	 this	 re-
spect	–	Ukraine,	as	had	previously	been	the	case,	verbally	declared	its	desire	
to	join	European	and	Euro-Atlantic	structures,	but	was	in	fact	doing	little	to	
















1. The political interests of the oligarchs
Contrary	to	what	is	the	case	with	domestic	policy,	it	is	more	difficult	to	track	
the	 role	 the	 oligarchs	 have	 played	 in	 the	 development	 of	 foreign	 policy	 in	



























2. The economic interests
While	ideological	issues	play	a	minor	role	in	the	activities	of	big	business,	the	
situation	is	quite	different	 in	economic	relations.	The	interests	of	Ukrainian	
business	circles	in	this	area	are	diversified.	For many oligarchs, especially 
those less powerful, the Ukrainian market is the most important, and 
they do not attach much significance to foreign relations, unless these 
relations result in increasing competitiveness on the internal market. In 
turn, for the richest businessmen, such as Akhmetov and Pinchuk, access 
to foreign markets is of key significance. Ukrainian	exports	are	strongly	




































































Ukraine’s exports in 2011 (in Us$ billions)
Own	calculations	on	the	basis	of	data	from	the	State	Statistics	Committee
3. The attitude towards integration projects
Due	 to	 the	aforementioned	conflicts of interests, the oligarchs cannot be 
said to hold one common stance on integration processes in the region; 
this is true in the case of those initiated by Russia, and those regarding 





is	relatively	transparent,	and	Firtash.	The integration processes offered by 
the eU and Russia alike may bring about both benefits and threats to the 
special Ukrainian model of relations between the government and busi-
ness, although they are quite different in nature.	
EU-27 Other countriesCIS countries
Total exports Base metals Mineral raw materials






















































133	 The	 cyclically	published	 reports	 concerning	 this	 issue,	depending	on	who	 the	author	 is,	
are	either	usually	focused	on	the	positives	(if	these	are	analytical	centres	from	the	EU	or	








the	Eurasian	Development	Bank,	 ‘Комплексная оценка макроэкономического эффекта 
различных форм глубокого экономического сотрудничества Украины со странами 














None of the oligarchs is interested in introducing free and fair compe-
tition in Ukraine, since this would mean a major change in the nature 
of their business activity. Nevertheless, the introduction of some ele-
ments of Western standards, especially the respect of ownership rights, 
is viewed by big business as being desirable.	Although	no	spectacular	fall	
of	any	representative	of	big	business	has	been	seen	over	the	past	decade	or	so,	
present	 trends	–	 and	primarily	President	Yanukovych’s	 strengthening	posi-
tion	–,	are	causing	the	protection	of	ownership	rights	to	become	a	very	up-to-
date	issue.	
While	 the	 question	 of	what	 benefits	 the	Association	Agreement	 could	bring	
to	the	oligarchs	is	a	debatable	issue,	it	seems	certain	that	no representative 
of big business is interested in a further deterioration of relations with 






not	 engaged	 economically	 in	 EU	member	 states,	 they	 often	 own	 real	 estate	
there134.	For	this	reason	a	development	of	relations	with	the	West	which	would	
see	 a	 repeat	 of	 the	Belarusian	 scenario	would	be	difficult	 for	 the	Ukrainian	
business	elite	to	accept.	Possible	political	sanctions,	such	as	visa	restrictions	







tal	 area	as	economic	 integration	with	 the	European	Union.	When	 it	became	


























3.2. co-operation with Russia
Russia	is	offering	Ukraine	a	regional	integration	project,	which	is	competitive	






Russia	 is	 the	most	 important	 country	 for	 Ukrainian	 business.	 The	 Russian	








almost	70%	of	Ukrainian	 imports	 from	Russia	and	 that	Kyiv	must	buy	 them	
anyway,	the	possibilities	for	Ukraine	to	counteract	Russian	practices	are	very	
limited.	
considering the degree of dependence and the number of ways Moscow 
could put pressure on Kyiv, representatives of Ukrainian big business are 
135	 Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	Kamil	Kłysiński,	 Iwona	Wiśniewska,	 ‘Common	Economic	Space:	



















not interested in a direct dispute with Russia. They are even less inter-
ested in that because Russia is an important trade partner for most of the 
oligarchs, including	those	for	whom	other	markets	are	of	top	priority.	Both	
Akhmetov	 and	 Pinchuk	 sell	 steel	 pipes	 for	 pipeline	 construction	 to	 Russia.	




this,	Kyiv is unlikely to agree to join the customs Union. The tariffs appli-
cable in the area covered by the customs Union are higher than the ones 
Ukraine was granted upon its accession to the WTO. The renegotiation of 
these tariffs would be very difficult and would be contrary to the inter-
ests of the exporter oligarchs. 
Another	equally	great	temptation	for	Ukraine	is	the	promise	of	lowering	the	
price	of	energy	raw	materials,	 especially	gas.	 In	 the	second	quarter	of	2012,	
Ukraine	paid	US$426	for	1,000	m3	of	gas,	while	the	gas	price	for	Belarus,	which	
belongs	 to	 the	Customs	Union,	was	only	US$165.	The	prices	are	essential	 for	
industry,	especially	 the	chemical	 sector,	 the	greater	part	of	which	 is	owned	
by	Dmytro	Firtash.	Due	to	the	high	prices	of	oil	and	gas.	Ukrainian	plants	are	
becoming	less	and	less	competitive.	
Moscow	 has	 declared	 the	 possibility	 to	 reduce	 gas	 prices	 in	 exchange	 for	

































that	if the internal factor comes into conflict with state interests, the oli-





If	their	business	is	at	stake,	the oligarchs are able to successfully hold back 







Ukraine	 reached	 a	 compromise	 regarding	 imports	 and	 adopted	 regulations	
which	can	be	seen	as	being	favourable	for	Vasadze140.	




























announced	date	 for	 the	agreement	 to	be	 signed	has	already	been	postponed	







tunity	 for	 the	Ukrainian	airlines	 to	expand	across	Europe,	but	Kolomoyskyi	
and	the	other	carriers	apparently	prefer	 to	protect	 their	own	market142.	The	
existing	situation	is	also	beneficial	for	the	government:	airlines	must	obtain	
licences	 from	state	officials,	while	 the	ECAA	provides	 the	possibility	 to	 sign	
contracts	directly	with	airports.	
The	 activity	 of	 Vasyl	 Hrytsak,	 a	 businessman	 and	 an	MP	 representing	 the	











try’s	foreign	policy.	It is difficult to classify the oligarchs as holding either 
pro-european or pro-Russian views. Any of their actions which could 


















of the implementation of their own interests than a conscious policy. 
Kolomoyskyi	has	been	blocking	the	ECAA	in	order	to	restrict	the	competition	
to	his	own	business	and	not	due	to	any	ideology.	It	is	equally	difficult	to	prove	





































V. The ADVANTAGes AND The DIsADVANTAGes  
OF The OlIGARchIc sysTeM
It	is	not	easy	to	unambiguously	evaluate	the	role	the	oligarchs	have	played	in	
Ukraine.	At	first	glance,	their	impact	on	Ukraine	appears	to	be	negative.	How-










An evaluation of the impact the oligarchs have had on politics and the 
economy reveals some benefits for Ukraine. The greatest benefit is the 
protection of Ukraine’s economy from being dominated by Russian busi-
ness. however, the negative consequences of the oligarchic systems, for 
both the economy and the political life of Ukraine, are more evident and 
ultimately definitely prevail over the positives. 


























•	 The dependence of the greater part of the political class on big busi-




ence.	To	 claim	 that	politicians	 are	puppets	 in	 the	hands	of	businessmen	
would	certainly	be	an	exaggeration.	The	Ukrainian	political	system	gives	
real	 power	 to	 the	 government.	 Both	 Kuchma	 and	 Tymoshenko	 showed	







nancial	 support	and	presence	 in	 the	media,	and	have	 thus	been	success-
fully	marginalised.	
•	 Actions	taken	by	Ukrainian	state	officials	in	an	attempt	to	 ‘pay	back’	the	
financial	support	during	the	elections	often	lead	to	the Ukrainian state 
sustaining multi-billion dollar losses, which the oligarchs benefit 
from. This	practice	has	been	used	by	all	administrations,	but	it	has	clearly	
intensified	 under	 Yanukovych’s	 rule.	 This	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	
case	of	 the	RUE	Group.	RosUkrEnergo	won	the	arbitration	 in	Stockholm,	
and	furthermore,	Ukrtranshaz	decided	to	write	off	RUE’s	significant	debts.	





metallurgical	industry.	however, if necessary and if a good price is of-
fered, the oligarchs do not mind selling their assets, and in such cases 
Russian capital is usually the only buyer. The	clearest	example	of	this	


























only	a	small	extent.	The	oligarchs	are	not	 the	only	ones	 to	blame	for	 the	
problems	with	 foreign	 investments.	 Other	 serious	 impediments	 include	
the	still	high	level	of	corruption	and	the	low	efficiency	of	the	state	admin-
istration.	However,	 it	 is	 the	 lobbying	 from	big	business	 that	 seems	 to	be	
the	main	reason	behind	these	phenomena.	Ukraine	has	always	been	a	very	
challenging	market	for	investors,	but	after	two	years	of	Yanukovych’s	rule,	
despite	macroeconomic	 stabilisation,	 the	 situation	 has	 deteriorated	 fur-
ther.	The	Ukrainian	government	has	not	taken	any	measures,	so	there	are	
no	grounds	to	expect	that	the	situation	will	improve	in	this	area.	
•	 The monopolisation which	can	be	observed	in	many	sectors	of	the	econ-






•	 In	many	cases,	the primacy of private interests over the interests of 
the state has negative results. The	clearest	example	of	this	is	the	prison	
sentence	 imposed	on	Yulia	Tymoshenko,	which	 the	RUE	Group	managed	
to	push	 through.	As	 seen	 from	the	perspective	of	Firtash’s	 interests,	 the	
147	 According	 to	 UNCTAD,	 the	 level	 of	 foreign	 direct	 investments	 in	 Ukraine	 in	 2005–2010	





















ness as temporary and they are attempting to maximise their profits 
and minimise the expenses. In	 effect,	most	 industrial	 plants	 have	 not	
been	modernised	 since	 Soviet	 times	 and	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	 out-
dated.	Even	those	businessmen	who	invest	some	money,	such	as	Akhme-
tov,	 usually	 do	 it	 at	 the	minimum	 level.	Given	 the	 low	political	 stability	
of	Ukraine,	this	approach	is	unlikely	to	change	in	the	predictable	future.	
•	 Even	if	the	oligarchs	see	the	need	for	comprehensive	reforms	to	be	imple-
mented	 in	Ukraine,	 they	are	successfully	 influencing	 the	government	so	
that	the	reforms	are	made	primarily	in	those	areas	which	are	not	linked	
directly	to	big	business	(for	example,	the	pension	system	reform).	In	turn,	






•	 The concentration of capital in the hands of a relatively small group 
of people is impeding the development of a middle class. Big	business	
lobbies	for	solutions	which	are	favourable	to	itself,	so	when	it	is	necessary	
to	 increase	state	revenues,	 this	 is	usually	done	at	the	expense	of	the	 less	
powerful	businessmen.	This	became	especially	clear	 following	 the	adop-
tion	of	 the	new	fiscal	 code.	Although	 the	code	was	a	positive	move	 in	 it-
self,	it	imposed	heavier	fiscal	levies	primarily	on	small	and	medium-sized	
























also	helps	protect the country’s economic independence from the ex-





taken	 over	 by	 Russian	 companies	 and	 still	 have	 problems	 in	Ukraine148.	






criminal	 underworld,	 to	 being	 patrons	 of	 the	 arts	 and	 sport.	 This	 trend	
was	set	by	Viktor	Pinchuk,	who	is	the	main	sponsor	of	Ukrainian	modern	
art	 and	promoter	of	European	 integration	 since	he	organises	 the	annual	
YES	summits.	Pinchuk	is	also	the	organiser	and	sponsor	of	the	‘Ukrainian	
lunch’,	which	takes	place	during	the	World	Economic	Forum	in	Davos150.	












150	 In	 2010,	 Pinchuk	 climbed	 to	 first	 place	 in	 the	 ranking	 of	 the	world’s	main	 lobbyists	 for	
Ukraine	compiled	by	the	Kyiv-based	Institute	of	World	Policy,	‘Виктор Пинчук возглавил 




















position from the key oligarchic groups to a deeper integration with 
Russia has been among the main reasons why Ukraine has not decid-
ed to become seriously engaged in any integration project initiated 
by Russia. This	reluctance	 is	caused	mainly	by	the	Ukrainian	oligarchs’	








Ukrainian	democracy	 is	 far	 from	perfect,	 it	 still	needs	 to	be	emphasised	
that	so	far	all	the	governments	have	changed	as	a	result	of	elections.	One 
of the reasons why this has been possible is the stance adopted by big 
business. The oligarchs do not form a homogeneous group and fierce-
















VI. POssIBle FUTURe DeVelOPMeNTs OF The OlIGARchIc 
sysTeM
•	 It seems unlikely that President yanukovych could decide to upset the 
balance between the two key oligarchic groups, the ‘Donetsk clan’ and 















•	 Some	observers	of	the	Ukrainian	political	scene,	in connection with ‘the 
family’ gaining strength see the threat of Ukraine undergoing ‘Puti-


















































ued,	many of the plants (and probably even entire sectors) will not 
be able to come up against competition from developing countries in 


























•	 While	 future	 reshuffles	 among	 the	 groups	 of	 influence	 are	possible	 (and	
will	certainly	take	place),	there is still little chance that the model of re-
lations between the ruling class and big business will change, at least 












weak	banking	system.	If, however, the breakdown is deeper and lasts 




























Forbes	 assessed	 that	 Akhmetov’s	 fortune	 was	 worth	 US$1.8	 billion,	 which	




































Despite	 these	 limitations,	 the	 rankings	 of	 Ukraine’s	 richest	 people	 are	 use-















List of Ukraine’s richest people in 2011 (US$ millions)
Korrespondent Focus 
1 Rinat	Akhmetov 25,600 1 Rinat	Akhmetov 15,590
2 Henadiy	Boholyubov 6,600 2 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi 5,323
3 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi 6,200 3 Henadiy	Boholyubov 4,975
4 Viktor	Pinchuk 5,900 4 Viktor	Pinchuk 2,970
5 Kostyantin	Zhevago 3,200 5 Vadym	Novinsky 2,683
6 Viktor	Nusenkis 2,900 6 Kostyantin	Zhevago 2,675
7 Dmytro	Firtash 2,250 7 Andriy	Verevsky 2,200



















9 Oleksiy	Martynov 1,520 9 Serhiy	Taruta 2,126
10 Oleksiy	Vadatursky 1,500 10 Vitaliy	Hayduk 2,073
11 Yuriy	Kosyuk 1,300 11 Yuriy	Kosyuk 2,070
12 Oleksandr	Yaroslavsky 1,200 12 Oleh	Mkrtczyan 1,877
13 Petro	Poroshenko 980 13 Dmytro	Firtash 1,489
14 Ivan	Huta 918 14 Oleksandr	Shnaider 1,407
15 Serhiy	Taruta 730 15 Eduard	Shyfryn 1,407
16 Oleh	Mkrtchyan 730 16 Oleksandr	Yaroslavsky 1,403
17 Andriy	Verevsky 716 17 Petro	Poroshenko 1,193
18 Vyacheslav	Bohuslayev 704 18 Vasyl	Khmelnytsky 1,173
19 Valeriy	Khoroshkovskyi 599 19 Oleh	Bakhmatyuk 1,093
20 Leonid	Chernovetskyi 556 20 Leonid	Baisarov 1,060
21 Anatoliy	Yurevich 548 21 Andriy	Ivanov 1,015
22 Serhiy	Tihipko 535 22 Leonid	Yurushev 979
23 Mykola	Yankovsky 522 23 Ivan	Huta 939
24 Yukhym	Zvyahilsky 504 24 Oleksiy	Martynov 930




26 Olha	Nechytailo 476 26 Mykola	Tolmachov 892




28 Borys	Kolesnikov 448 28 Oleksandr	Savchuk 868
29 Yevhen	Chernyak 447 29 Vyacheslav	Bohuslayev 845
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between	 the	 oligarch	 and	 the	 future	 president	 began.	 Yanukovych	was	 the	
political	representative	of	the	Donetsk	clan,	first	as	the	governor	(1997–2002)	
and	later	as	the	prime	minister	(2002	–	 January	2005),	while	Akhmetov	was	
the	most	 important	businessman	 in	 the	 clan.	This	was	 the	 time	of	 the	 sud-

















































panies	which	 specialise	 in	 production	 sales.	 The	 fact	 that	MetInvest	 has	 its	
own	ore	mines	ensures	it	access	to	cheap	raw	materials164.	
MetInvest	 is	 Ukraine’s	 largest	 iron	 ore	 manufacturer.	 The	 Ingulets	 works,	
Northern	works	and	Central	works	all	extract	and	enrich	ore.	The	Komsomol-
skoye	 ore	mine	produces	 limestone,	 and	Krasnodonugol	 is	Ukraine’s	 second	











of	 transporting	 the	 holding’s	 products	 both	 inside	 Ukraine	 and	 for	 export.	
MetInvest-Ukraine,	MetInvest-SMC,	MetInvest-International	and	MetInvest-	
-Eurasia	sell	the	holding’s	production	in	Ukraine	and	abroad.	
163	 Value	 at	 end	 of	 2010	 according	 to	 data	 from	 SCM	 http://www.scm.com.ua/ru/business/
overview/
164	 Akhmetov	 also	 used	 this	 against	 his	 competitors	 from	 ISD,	 who	 –	 given	 the	 high	 ore	
prices	 offered	 by	MetInvest	 –	were	 forced	 to	 buy	 raw	materials	 from	Russia	 and	Brazil:	






















Coal	 is	 mined	 by:	 Pavlogradugol,	 Dobropolyeugol,	 Sverdlovantratsyt	 and	
Rovenkyantratsyt	(each	of	them	owns	several	coal	mines)	and	the	Komsomo-
lets	Donbassa	coal	mine.	In	mid	2012,	DTEK	bought	three	coal	mines	in	Ros-
tov	Oblast	 (Russian	Federation):	Donskoy	Anthracite,	 Sulinantratsit	 and	 the	
Obukhovskaya	Mine,	which	are	located	close	to	the	Ukrainian	border,	so	as	to	
ensure	cheap	raw	material	supplies.	






Electricity	 is	 produced	 by	 businesses	 consisting	 of	 several	 thermal	 power	
plants:	Skhidenerho,	Kyivenergo,	Dnieproenergo	and	Zakhidenerho.	The	 lat-
ter	includes	‘Burshtyn	Island’	consisting	of	power	plants	which	are	integrated	
with	 the	EU’s	ENTSO-E,	which	makes	 it	possible	 to	 export	 electricity	 to	EU	
member	states.	The	plants	controlled	by	DTEK	produce	over	30%	of	Ukraine’s	
electricity	consumption.	DTEK	also	intends	to	develop	electricity	production	
using	 renewable	 energy	 sources.	 The	Wind	 Power	 company	 is	 planning	 to	
build	wind	power	plants	in	the	Donetsk	and	Zaporizhia	Oblasts.	
Electricity	sales	 to	 individual	and	 industrial	 recipients	 in	Ukraine	and	elec-
tricity	 exports	 are	 handled	 by	 Servis-Invest,	 PES-Energougol,	 DTEK	 Power	
Trade,	Kyivenergo,	Donetskoblenerho	and	Dnieprooblenerho.	
















owns	 a	 television	 channel	 with	 nationwide	 coverage	 ‘Ukraina’,	 a	 regional	
channel	‘Donbass’	and	two	sports	channels	Football	and	Football+.	It	also	in-
cludes	the	Internet	portal	tochka.net.	




Other assets of System Capital Management
SCM	also	has	a	strong	position	in	other	sectors	of	the	economy:	
•	 In	 the	 financial	 sector,	 it	 controls	 the	 banks	 FUIB	 (Ukraine’s	 9th	 largest	
bank)	and	Renaissance	Credit	(114th	position)	and	the	insurance	companies	
ASKA	and	ASKA-Life.	
•	 In	 telecommunications,	 SCM	 controls	 the	 Astelit	 company,	 which	 owns	
a	45%	stake	in	Life,	the	mobile	network	operator,	and	Vega	Group,	one	of	
the	major	fixed-line	telephone	network	operators.	
•	 ESTA	 Group	 controls	 the	 real	 estate	 owned	 by	 SCM,	 including	 CUM	 in	

























is	being	devised	and	 is	 to	be	presented	 in	mid	2012.	This	holding	 stands	
a	great	chance	of	becoming	one	of	the	key	players	on	the	Ukrainian	agri-
cultural	market.	
•	 Furthermore,	 SCM	 owns	 the	 Parallel	 filling	 station	 chain	 and	 a	 chain	




He	 was	 born	 in	 1962	 in	 Mariupol,	 Donetsk	 Oblast.	 He	 was	 believed	 to	 be	











due	 to	 skipping	public	procurement	procedures	 for	most	of	 the	work.	This	
provided	ammunition	for	his	critics	to	accuse	him	of	abusing	his	powers	on	




tories:	 in	Donetsk,	Kostiantynivka,	Horlivka	 (Donetsk	Oblast)	 and	Kursk	
(Russia),	which	manufacture	around	15%	of	the	sweets	produced	in	Ukraine.	
168	 Тетяна Ніколаєнко, Сергій Лещенко, ‘Хто заробляє на Євро-2012? Друга частина 






































Most	 of	 Novinsky’s	 assets	 are	 located	 in	 Ukraine.	 He	 owns	 Smart	 Holding,	
which	includes	plants	operating	in	the	metallurgical,	shipbuilding,	construc-
tion	and	agricultural	sectors.	
•	 Smart	Holding	 is	SCM’s	business	partner	 in	metallurgy	and	agriculture.	
Novinsky	holds	a	25%	stake	in	MetInvest	and	half	of	the	shares	in	HarvEast.	






















•	 The	 holding	 also	 includes	 Smart-Nerudprom,	 which	 controls	 the	 plants	
which	manufacture	construction	materials	in	Crimea	and	Zaporizhia.	
•	 Balaklava	 Green	 is	 a	 holiday	 resort	 located	 around	 Balaklava,	 Crimea.	
Smart	 is	 also	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 preparations	 for	 the	Ochakiv	 port	 con-
struction	project.	
•	 It	owns	twenty	Amstore	hypermarkets.	
•	 In	 the	 agricultural	 sector,	 in	 addition	 to	 HarvEast,	 Novinsky	 owns	 the	
Veres	group	of	companies	(which	deal	with	fruit	production	and	process-
ing)	and	the	arboriculture	firm	Vesna.
3. The RUe Group
This	 name	 originates	 from	 the	 name	 of	 the	 company	 RosUkrEnergo	 (RUE),	
which	was	acting	as	an	agent	 in	Russian	gas	 imports	 in	2004–2009.	At	pre-
sent,	 along	with	 Akhmetov,	 this	 is	 the	most	 influential	 oligarchic	 group	 in	
















































of	Regions.	This	was	one	of	 the	 reasons	 for	his	bitter	 conflict	with	 the	 then	
prime	 minister,	 Yulia	 Tymoshenko,	 who	 in	 2009	 brought	 RosUkr	Energo’s	
status	 as	 an	 agent	 in	 Russian	 gas	 trade	 to	 an	 end.	When	 Yanukovych	won	
the	election	 in	2010,	Firtash	managed	to	carry	out	a	number	of	 takeovers	 in	
170	 Наталья Приходько, ‘Лица новой власти. Консильери’, LB.ua,	5	March	2010,	http://lb.ua/
news/2010/03/05/30151_litsa_novoy_vlasti_konsileri.html
171	 Фирташ, Дмитрий Васильевич, Генштабъ,	 25	May	 2012,	 http://genshtab.censor.net.ua/
wiki/Фирташ,_Дмитрий_Васильевич









































173	 Олег Гавриш, Александр Черновалов; Наталья Гриб, ‘Всеобщее удобрение’, Коммерсант,	
7	February	2011,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1580931?isSearch=True
174	 ‘Ostchem	импортировала из Средней Азии 4,8 млрд. кубометров газа’, УкрРудПром,	21	Feb-
ruary	 2012,	 http://ukrrudprom.ua/news/Ostchem_importirovala_48_mlrd_kubometrov_
gaza_iz_Sredney_Azii.html
175	 Roman	 Olearchyk,	 Neil	 Buckley,	 ‘Ukraine’s	 Firtash	 questioned	 over	 mafia	 ties’,	 Finan-



















tribution	 firms	 (oblhazes	 and	mistohazes),	which	 control	 the	 networks	 of	
gas	pipelines	distributing	gas	to	end	users.	This	concerns	majority	stakes	
in	at	least	several	of	the	52	oblhazes operating	in	Ukraine	(including	in	the	
Zakarpattia,	 Volhynia	 and	 Zhytomyr	 Oblasts)177.	 Furthermore,	 he	 holds	
options	which	authorise	the	purchase	of	shares	in	some	of	the	remaining	
oblhazes. He	is	also	among	the	leading	candidates	for	the	takeover	of	state-
owned	shares	 in	the	48	oblhazes and	mistohazes which	are	earmarked	for	
privatisation	in	2012.	
•	 In	 2011,	 Centragas,	 a	 company	 registered	 in	Austria	 (90%	Group	DF,	 10%	
Fursin)	bought	Nadra	Bank	(Ukraine’s	 11th	 largest	bank),	which	had	been	
nationalised	during	the	economic	crisis	in	2009.








He	embarked	on	political	activity	 in	 1996	by	 joining	the	People’s	Democratic	
Party	 of	 Ukraine	 led	 by	 Valeriy	 Pustovoitenko,	 who	 was	 later	 nominated	
prime	minister.	Khoroshkovskyi	was	elected	to	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	1998.	
He	 sought	election	 for	 the	next	 tenure	 in	2002	as	 a	 candidate	of	 a	new	par-
ty,	 Team	 of	Winter	 Generation,	which	 however	 did	 not	manage	 to	 pass	 the	
176	 Алексей Топалов, Ольга Алексеева, ‘Фирташ вернул одно название’,	Газетa.Ru.	9	Novem-
ber	2011,	http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2011/11/09/3827794.shtml














election	 threshold.	 In	 the	same	year,	he	was	nominated	first	deputy	head	of	
the	Presidential	Administration.	In	late	2002,	he	was	nominated	minister	for	
the	economy	 in	Yanukovych’s	government	but	he	 resigned	at	 the	beginning	
of	2004	after	a	conflict	with	the	then	deputy	prime	minister,	Azarov.	Follow-
ing	the	Orange	Revolution,	Khoroshkovskyi	managed	to	find	common	ground	










pears	 to	be	a	 relatively	 independent	player,	 and	his	 links	with	Firtash	have	
weakened	recently.	His	connections	with	Russian	capital	are	unclear.	Between	
2005	 and	 2006,	 Khoroshkovskyi	was	 the	 president	 of	 Russia’s	 Evraz	Group,	
one	of	the	world’s	largest	steel	manufacturers178.	Furthermore,	Russia’s	Kanal	
1	holds	a	29%	stake	in	Inter,	the	pivotal	TV	channel	in	Khoroshkovskyi’s	media	





He	bought	 it	 in	 2005.	U.A.	 Inter	Media	Group	 includes	 the	TV	channels:	
Inter,	 K1,	 K2,	 NTN,	Megasport	 and	MTV	Ukraine,	 and	 the	 news	 agency	
Ukrainian	News.	Some	media	outlets	have	reported	that	Firtash	is	the	real	
owner	of	Inter,	but	no	hard	evidence	has	been	put	forward	to	prove	this179.
•	 Between	 2004	 and	 2006	 Khoroshkovskyi,	 disposed	 of	most	 of	 his	 inter-
ests	in	other	economic	sectors.	He	sold	his	majority	stake	in	Ukrsocbank	
178	 Татьяна Ивженко, ‘Evraz Group возглавил украинец’, Независимая газета,	29	November	
2005,	http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-11-29/5_evraz.html
















4. The other oligarchs from the Party of Regions

















dismissal	 from	 this	 function	 in	February	2012,	 the	president	nominated	him	
secretary	of	the	National	Security	and	Defence	Council.	Klyuyev	is	among	the	
most	influential	politicians	in	the	Party	of	Regions	and	a	trusted	man	of	Presi-







180	 Променял “Евраз” на политику,	Ведомости,	12.12.2006,	http://www.vedomosti.ru/news-
paper/article/2006/12/12/117490







































bank	 (the	 6th	 largest	 in	Ukraine),	which	 is	 93.84%	 controlled	 by	 Russia’s	
Vnesheconombank.
182	 ‘Сергей Клюев, Андрей Клюев’,	Корреспондент,	 http://files.korrespondent.net/projects/
top50/2011/1229140
183	 ‘Андрей и Сергей Клюевы’,	Комментарии,	17	February	2011,	http://gazeta.comments.ua/?s
pec=1297976487&sart=1297977858















He	was	 born	 in	 1960	 in	 Draganesti	 (Moldova).	 He	 graduated	 from	 the	Met-








Pavlo	Lazarenko	 and	 then	by	Valeriy	Pustovoitenko	 (until	 1999).	 Some	 time	






































and	 TAS-Commerzbank	 to	 the	 Swedish	 group	 Swedbank	 for	more	 than	
US$700	million.	
•	 In	 the	 machine-building	 sector,	 TAS	 jointly	 with	 Privat	 Group	 controls	




of	chemist’s	 shops	and	 the	 ‘Stolichny’	 reinforced	concrete	 factory.	 It	also	
manages	 an	 agricultural	 company,	which	 leases	 30,000	hectares	 of	 land	
with	the	Swedish	investment	company	Kinnevik.	
4.3. Oleksandr yaroslavsky











185	 ‘Рейтинг страховых компаний Украины за 3 месяца 2012 г.’,	ForInsurer,	http://forinsurer.
com/ratings/nonlife/12/3/3/
186	 Николай Максимчук, ‘Павел Царук рискнул по-крупному’,	 Коммерсант,	 22	 February	
2012,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1878478



























5. Privat Group – Ihor Kolomoyskyi and henadiy Boholyubov
Privat	is	Ukraine’s	second	largest	financial	and	industrial	group,	after	Akhme-














188	 Андрей Самофалов, ‘Дмитрий Фирташ высаживается в Черкассах’,	Укррудпром,	4	March	
2011,	http://www.ukrrudprom.ua/digest/Dmitriy_Firtash_visagivaetsya_v_Cherkassah.html







































•	 As	 regards	 the	 oil	 production	 sector,	 Privat	 holds	 42%	 of	 the	 shares	 in	
Ukrnafta,	Ukraine’s	 largest	producer	of	 oil	 (2.5	million	 tonnes)	 and	gas	
190	 ‘Коломойский Игорь Валерьевич’,	Ліга.Досье,	20	April	2007,	http://file.liga.net/person/589-
igor-kolomoiskii.html
191	 ‘Коломойский пользовался услугами рейдеров’, Минпром,	27	February	2009,	http://min-
prom.ua/news/10541.html
192	 ‘Коломойский строит самый большой еврейский центр в СНГ’, Корреспондент,	5	August	
2008,	 http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/events/544658-kolomojskij-stroit-samyj-bolshoj-
evrejskij-centr-v-sng









































194	 Виробництво, Укрнафта, http://www.ukrnafta.com/ua/business/production





















•	 Privat-AgroHolding,	 established	 in	 2005,	 is	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 companies	
























Pinchuk’s	 business	 extends	 primarily	 to	 two	 areas:	 metallurgy	 (mainly	












































































•	 Bohdan	Corporation	 is	among	 the	key	manufacturers	of	 cars	and	 trucks	
and	 the	 largest	manufacturer	 of	 buses	 in	Ukraine.	 It	 includes	 Cherkasy	
Autobus,	assembly	plant	no.	1	(buses	and	trolleybuses),	no.	2	(motor	cars),	
no.	3	(trucks)	and	Bohdan	Motors198.	Furthermore,	the	corporation	controls	





198	 ‘Богдан Корпорация’,	 Ліга.Досье,	 4	 August	 2010	 http://file.liga.net/company/2060-bog-
dan_korporaciya.html













•	 ISTA	 is	 the	 largest	battery	manufacturer	 in	 the	Commonwealth	of	 Inde-
pendent	States200.	The	company	has	four	factories	in	Dnipropetrovsk.




to	 5,000	 tonnes,	 and	manufactures	metal	 and	machine	goods201.	 In	 2010,	























201	 Ленинская Кузница, ПАО Завод,	http://1201.ua.all.biz/






























and	 river	 ships.	 The	 Kremenchuk	 Automobile	 Plant	 and	 the	 Stakhanov	
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